

CABINET – 18 NOVEMBER 2015

LEICESTERSHIRE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE (LFRS) CONSULTATION ON THE INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN (IRMP) 2016-2020

DECISION AND COMMENTS MADE AT THE SCRUTINY COMMISSION MEETING

Purpose of Report

- 1. The purpose of this supplementary report is to advise the Cabinet of:-
 - (a) the decision of the Scrutiny Commission concerning the Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) 2016 -2020;
 - (b) a motion put forward at the meeting but not agreed;
 - (c) views expressed by members and witnesses who attended the meeting which are set out in the detailed minute of the meeting.
- 2. Copies of the submissions made to the Scrutiny Commission are appended to this report.

Scrutiny Commission Meeting

- 3. The Scrutiny Commission met on Wednesday 4 November and again on Monday 9 November to consider this matter. The Commission had invited the following to address it:
 - The Chief and Deputy Chief Fire Officer of the Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service;
 - The Treasurer to the Combined Fire Authority
 - Representatives of the Fire Brigades Union;
 - The President of the Retained Firefighters Union;
 - Retired members of the Fire Service;
 - Mr. L. Yates CC.

Decision of the Commission

4. The Scrutiny Commission decided as follows:-

"That the Cabinet be advised as follows:-

- That the Commission has noted the concerns expressed by the Fire Brigades Union, the Retained Firefighters Union, retired members of the Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service and others about the potential impact of these proposals;
- 2. That the members of the Council and the Scrutiny Commission have received a detailed presentation from the Chief Fire Officer (CFO) and his colleagues on the consultation proposal and would wish to draw the following matters to the Cabinet:
 - i. That there are significant financial pressures on the Combined Fire Authority (CFA) and the consultation proposals should be seen in that context;
 - ii. That the consultation proposals should be seen in the context of a 42% reduction in emergency incident rates in the last 10 years;
 - iii. That the proposals now outlined by the CFO represent his and his management team's professional assessment of the best use of reduced resources to deal with risk;
 - iv. That whilst the CFA previously disestablished 101 operational posts financial provision continues to be made for these posts in the absence of an agreement with the trade unions as to a way forward, a situation which cannot be allowed to continue;
 - v. That the CFA is pressing ahead with proposals for reducing its costs by engaging in shared service agreements and exploring a range of uses by other organisations of office space at its Headquarters."
- 5. This motion was put and carried, 6 members voting for the motion and 5 against.

Motion put and not agreed

6. The following motion was moved by Mr. Sharp CC and seconded by Mr. Charlesworth CC but not agreed:-

"That the Cabinet be advised as follows:-

- 1. That the Commission finds that the scale of cuts outlined in the proposals present an unnecessary and unacceptable risk to the operational performance of the Combined Fire Authority and that this view is based on evidence that points to:-
 - (a) A lack of clarity or confidence in the CFA's ability to remove surplus staff that is contributing to over half of its projected deficit with no plausible plan in place to tackle this as a matter of urgency thereby inflating the problem and creating a real risk that further cost savings attributable to redundancies would not come to fruition;

- (b) Opportunities that exist to explore alternative cost reduction proposals that might alleviate the need for the scale of cuts proposed, including but not limited to:
 - (i) Greater use of retained firefighters;
 - (ii) Extending the 'life' of existing vehicles;
 - (iii) Greater collaborative working with local and regional emergency services;
 - (iv) Various 'cheaper' staff proposals;
 - (v) The sale or lease of the Birstall Headquarters and to decamp to Central Fire Station or another existing building;
 - (vi) More appropriate use of Tactical Response Vehicles.
- (c) Weaknesses and lack of openness in the modelling of response times which provides real concern at the Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service's ability to respond in a timely manner with the weight of response required;
- (d) The process of putting together the IRMP being very exclusive, relying heavily on senior officers and failing to draw on the wide experience within the LFRS;
- (e) The consultation being too narrow in its content, having failed to properly contact key stakeholders within and immediately outside the area, being inadequately signposted to the public thereby restricting access to those without internet access and as such not being undertaken in accordance with the 'Gunning principles.'
- 2. The Commission therefore urges the Cabinet to:-
 - (a) Oppose the proposals and seek an urgent review of alternative cost reduction options to reduce the scale of cuts required from frontline services and for this review to be more inclusive of officers within the CFA;
 - (b) Seek from the CFA a clear plan for the early delivery of the resource reduction required to deliver the £1.3million overdue savings;
 - (c) Request the CFA to carry out a full and transparent audit of its incident response times including the measurement of appropriate 'weight of response times';
 - (d) Request the CFA to commission an "external audit" of future proposals;
 - (e) Note that the lack of a scrutiny process within the CFA has impacted negatively on the quality of debate and to recommend that the CFA reviews its scrutiny process."

Proceedings at the Scrutiny Commission

7. A detailed minute of the proceedings is set out at **Appendix 1** to this supplementary report, together with the following documents/presentations made at the meeting:-

Annex A - LFRS Presentation - Medium Term Financial Options and Issues
Annex B - LFRS Presentation - Towards 2020 IRMP
Annex C - Briefing note of the Fire Brigade Union
Annex D - RFU Interim Response to Leicestershire Fire
Annex E - Open letter from Retired Firefighters
Annex F - Comments from Pauline Lindsay, Kibworth Harcourt Parish
Councillor
Annex G - Community Risk Model - September 2014
Annex H - Images of a Tactical Response Vehicle
Annex I - Operational Fire Station costs 2014-15
Annex J - Retained Availability as at August 2014-July 2015

Recommendation

8. The Cabinet is asked to take into account the decision of the Scrutiny Commission and other views expressed at the meeting in reaching its view on the recommendation it wishes to put the County Council.

Officer to Contact:

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SCRUTINY COMMISSION

MEETINGS HELD ON 4 AND 9 NOVEMBER 2015

LEICESTERSHIRE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE CONSULTATION ON THE INTERGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 2016-2020

DRAFT MINUTE EXTRACT

The Commission considered the Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service's (LFRS) Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) 2016-2020. The matter was before the Commission today as a result of an extraordinary meeting of the County Council held on 8 October which had resolved that the Scrutiny Commission should consider the consultation proposals in the first instance with a view to submitting its comments to the Cabinet for consideration at its meeting on 18 November in order that a properly considered response could be debated at the full County Council meeting to be held on 2 December. It was noted that a detailed briefing on the consultation proposals and LFRS's budget position had been had been held for all members of the Council on 2 November.

The Chairman welcomed to the meeting the following representatives of LFRS who were in attendance to deliver a presentation to members and respond to any questions:

Richard Chandler, Chief Fire Officer Alison Greenhill, Combined Fire Authority Treasurer Steve Lunn, Deputy Chief Fire Officer

(A copy of the slides forming the presentations delivered by Messrs. Chandler and Lunn and by Ms. Greenhill is filed with these minutes)

Arising from the presentations given, the following points were noted:

<u>Budget</u>

- The number of posts that had been "disestablished" as a means of avoiding compulsory redundancy was 101. A "six point" plan was in effect to avoid compulsory redundancy, which included options such as career breaks and secondment, however it was not possible to "force" firefighters down these routes. Compulsory redundancy of firefighters would in all probability result in local and national industrial action;
- 21 operational staff would be in a position to retire over the next 5 years. It had been forecast in the budget that firefighters would retire when eligible. Funding to

cope with this had been built into the budget accordingly;

- 7% capital financing in the County was not considered to be excessive, given the Service only received very small amounts of grant funding. The figure was higher for the City;
- The CFA aimed to build a contingency fund of £300k per year over the next four years as a result of the ongoing uncertainty of the budget position as set by the Government;
- The "Grey Book" was a term used for national conditions of service for firefighters, however LFRS worked outside the terms of the book for some of its services;
- LFRS had of the leanest upper management tiers of fire services in the country. 18 members of middle management staff had recently been removed. The Service had also employed a member of staff from the City Council as its Treasurer and were exploring with the County Council the possibility of legal and governance services being provided as a means of identifying further savings. Opportunities for further reductions were being explored on an ongoing basis, as well as more innovative solutions, such as possible mergers of some services with the Police Service and East Midlands Ambulance Service. Fire Investigation and Urban Search and Rescue Services were already shared with Leicestershire Police;

IRMP - General

- The modelling work on which the proposals had been formulated identified the level of risk in each "super output area" and included data around travel distances and the best routes to follow for incidents. The modelling data was published on the LFRS website;
- External audit of the Fire Service was undertaken in respect of finance and governance. The last peer review that had been conducted at Leicestershire was around four years ago. This was considered to be the average in terms of timescale;
- The consultation documents did not include the availability of cover from adjacent fire stations in neighbouring authorities.

Tactical Response Vehicles (TRVs)

 TRVs would respond to incidents and create a safe scene – they would not be equipped to deal with a house fire and other incidents of this and larger scales. The vehicles would not be expected to resolve incidents in isolation and would be supported at large scale scenes by a fire engine. If fire engines were not available at Leicestershire stations, they would be brought in from neighbouring Fire Services though capacity was built in to ensure this was a last resort;

- The target response time of 10 minutes was based around the arrival of the first appliance to a scene (ie. either a fire engine or a TRV) in accordance with standard procedures. Every incident type had a predetermined attendance based around the response required (ie. the appliance and the expertise);
- Billesdon Station would be the only station in the County to be equipped with only a TRV. It was acknowledged that under the proposals a fire engine attending a scene in this area was unlikely to meet the 10 minute response time. However, it was highlighted that Billesdon Station attended, on average, only two incidents per year where a fire engine was required and it was noted that it was not currently possible to meet this target in the Billesdon area with the equipment available;
- There were differing styles of TRV, with crews of between two and three firefighters, depending on the nature of the incident at which they were required.

The Chairman welcomed to the meeting the following members of the Fire Brigade Union (FBU):

Graham Vaux, Brigade Chair Adam Taylor, Health and Safety representative Phil Coates, Executive Council Member for the Region

In introducing themselves, it was indicated that Mr. Vaux and Mr. Taylor were both professional firefighters with significant experience in the Fire Service. A copy of the submission from the FBU is filed with these minutes.

They made the following points:

- There would be a total reduction of 190 from the available 650 firefighters. It was felt that reductions to frontline services should be kept to a minimum and there were viable alternatives to these proposals which would not risk public safety;
- The removal of Kibworth and Central Stations would leave the public unsafe the closure of Central was highlighted as being particularly dangerous given it dealt with around 1500 calls per year and was the busiest station in the County. There was a lack of clarity around the equipment used to respond to high-rise incidents and where this would be stored were Central to be closed;
- 9 fire engines were to be removed under the proposals, leaving a total of 19 for the whole County;
- The introduction of TRVs was a concern as they were untried and untested in Leicestershire and with only a fraction of the equipment carried compared to that of a traditional fire engine. The vehicles were not capable of life saving operations, but were intended to be sent to most incidents;
- The City of Leicester would be expected to operate with only 3 fire engines and this was felt to be significantly less than other cities of similar size;

- Huge areas of the County would be left with little or no fire service coverage at all;
- Incidents of rescue operations were known to be on the increase;
- Though incidents as large scale as the Kegworth Air Disaster in 1989 were few, there were many significant incidents attended which required a level of response that would be unachievable were the proposals to be agreed;
- The FBU's suggested sale of Birstall Fire HQ would achieve savings of £11 million, which could be put towards achieving transformational ways of working and collaborative initiatives;
- Raising the council tax precept should also be considered as an alternative option.

Arising from the presentation, the following points of the FBU were noted:

- The FBU was actively assisting in supporting those in the disestablished 101 posts to take up alternative options, such as secondment. This had meant that over 30 members of staff had been encouraged down this route thus far. A further 20 were being encouraged to retire;
- The TRVs had less equipment than a fire engine and were primarily based around initial attendance at a scene or stabilising a vehicle at a road traffic collision. The FBU felt that a priority should be placed on life saving activities. There was a large discrepancy between how management and the FBU viewed the TRVs;
- The FBU was of the view that water rescues could increase in the future as a result of increased flooding and incidents of this type required a minimum crew of five. The TRVs were not capable of rescues of any type and would not be an adequate response in these circumstances;
- The FBU said that it had not been actively consulted on the proposals or been given an opportunity to discuss alternatives prior to going out to consultation.

The Chairman welcomed to the meeting Anthony Morgan, President of the Retained Firefighters Union (RFU). A copy of the submission from the RFU is filed with these minutes. Mr. Morgan did not wish to add to his submission.

Arising from questions, the following points made by Mr. Morgan were noted:

- Retained Firefighters were viewed as "easy targets" for the cuts as they were not viewed as being "operational" staff;
- There had been no consultation with the RFU in regard to the alternate proposals they had put forward as a means of identifying the required savings;

- The proposals did not include any information around station costs. The RFU had obtained information in this regard from LFRS via a freedom of information request;
- Retained firefighters were regarded as being "part-time" workers and so were provided with the same training opportunities as whole time staff, albeit provided over a longer period of time.

The Chairman welcomed to the meeting the following retired firefighters who had previously been employed at LFRS:

Ian Lockyer (previously Manager at Billesdon Station) Chris Bilby (predominantly an operational staff member) Paul Percival (previously a Group Manager)

A copy of the submission from the retired firefighters is filed with these minutes. It was noted that the retired firefighters had also submitted a separate paper to all elected members of the Council.

They made the following points:

- They had a current understanding of the working practices of LFRS and had experience of devising and implementing IMRPs;
- The current proposals had been developed by a small elite group exercising a narrow perspective;
- The consultation process had been severely flawed and had not adhered to the "Gunning Principles" or Government guidance on how to conduct a consultation process;
- The IRMP proposals were operationally unsound, based on simplistic modelling and were biased towards solutions designed to address fiscal constraints whilst at the same time disregarding risk;
- Evidence provided by LFRS had been misleading. The role of TRVs had been misrepresented;
- It was hoped that LFRS would have engaged all of the expertise in its management to produce a set of proposals that would improve operational capability, rather than diminish it.

Arising from questions, the following points made by the retired firefighters were noted:

• Billesdon Station would have a TRV available 24 hours a day. 75% of the time when the fire engine was currently available at the Station was at periods of high risk when there was a higher potential for road traffic collisions or house fires;

- The "Gunning Principles" aimed to ensure meaningful consultation and highlighted the importance of (i) formulating consultation at an "informative" stage, (ii) enabling informative consideration and response, (iii) adequate time being given to consideration and response and (iv) the findings being taken into consideration. It was felt that the 10 week period of consultation for proposals of this magnitude was inadequate;
- Some consultation events had been poorly attended. It was felt that this had indicated a lack of awareness and publicity for the consultation and the proposals that were being put forward. A suggestion was made that banners could have been erected at fire stations to raise awareness;
- It was suggested that, by having issued some guidance on operational procedures for the use of TRVs, LFRS had already taken a decision to implement their use;
- A decision on the proposals would be made by the CFA and not, as had been stated in the submission, a small number of senior officers;
- It was felt that running a referendum on a council tax precept increase should be explored as a means of retaining capacity;
- It was suggested that TRVs were a valuable resource but should not be treated as an alternative to traditional fire engines. It was felt that the right spread of tools would need to be available to LFRS in order to carry out its role effectively;
- Whilst the Service had managed to meet demand with only six fire engines over the strike period, it was felt that this was due to a large scale campaign to make the public aware of the strikes and the likely limited service that would be available during this time.

The Chairman welcomed to the meeting Mr. L. Yates CC, the County Councillor for Glenfields, who had requested the opportunity to address the Commission on the proposals.

Mr. Yates CC made the following points having discussed the proposals with some operational staff at LFRS over the past weeks:

- The CFO had informed members at the briefing held on 2 November that if the proposals were agreed and proved not to be effective, he would have to go back to the CFA and gain their views on an alternative approach. This was not felt to be acceptable;
- LFRS had abused statistics and data to make their points;
- There was a sense of fear and intimidation and a lack of communication between senior officers and frontline staff;

- The expertise of dedicated staff would be lost should these proposals be agreed;
- The country was at a high risk of a terror attack and it was felt that this was a very unfortunate time to be making such severe cuts to the Service.

(Arising from the evidence that had been gathered it was felt that it would be beneficial to give the Chief Fire Officer the opportunity to respond to the points and claims made. It was therefore suggested by the Chairman and agreed by the Commission that it would adjourn and reconvene at a meeting on Monday 9 November at 10.00am to enable the Chief Fire Officer to respond to the points made and for some conclusions to be drawn by members from the session in order that these could be forward on to the Cabinet for its consideration.)

- The Scrutiny Commission reconvened at 10.00am on Monday 9 November -

The Chairman explained to members that the Commission had reconvened to enable it to:

- Hear from the CFO in regard to summing up its points and responding to any pertinent issues raised by those witnesses whose evidence had been taken at the meeting on 4 November; and
- Conclude its findings for forwarding on to the Cabinet.

The Commission considered a supplementary pack of information containing the following pieces of information requested by the Commission during the debate:

- Community Risk Modelling work undertaken by LFRS;
- Operational Fire Station costs 2014/15;
- Retained availability as at August 2014.

(The latter two documents had been obtained by the RFU as a result of a Freedom of Information Request and this information had been verified by LFRS as being accurate.)

Arising from a further presentation from the Chief and Deputy Fire Officer, the following points were noted in response to those points raised previously by the FBU, the RFU and retired firefighters:

<u>FBU</u>

- TRVs would be used to respond to 80% of the calls received by the Service, which were mostly "low level" incidents. The number of large scale incidents was quite rare and TRVs would not be used as the "first attendants" in these circumstances;
- An image illustrating the equipment carried by a TRV used by LFRS on a trial basis was circulated to members (A copy of this illustration is filed with these minutes). It was considered to be adequately equipped to deal with all low-level

incidents;

- Policies were in place for the use of TRVs as a result of a TRV that was on-loan and in use in Rutland on a trial basis. The exact specification of the vehicles that could be used in Leicestershire as a result of the proposals had not yet been established;
- The Service currently had 28 fire engines and would be moving down to 19, with an additional 3 TRVs, should the proposals be agreed. TRVs were not capable of life-saving operations. It was for this reason that LFRS was retaining a fleet of traditional fire engines;
- By spreading resources more evenly across the County, it was envisaged that the Service would be able to keep to its "10 minute attendance time" performance measure;
- It was felt that speed of response by the Fire Service was only one of a number of factors that affected casualty rates;
- There would be 7 fire appliances to cover the City area rather than the 3 suggested by the FBU. 5 appliances would be used to respond to high-rise incidents, which would leave cover for other incidents were they required. Resources could also be called upon from other areas in the County and, where necessary, outside of the County. These arrangements were well established;
- The Service, as part of arrangements via the Fire and Rescue Service National Co-ordination Centre, could respond robustly to large-scale incidents on a national basis. Resources could be called on from across the whole of the United Kingdom, where necessary;
- Automatic fire alarm call-outs had been dramatically reduced over the past five years and work continued to improve performance further in this area. The Service did not intend to charge for false alarms, as in most cases these incidents occurred at public buildings such as hospitals. It was felt that this would therefore merely shift public money from one agency to another;
- The number of rescue operations that occurred in 2010/11 was 363, the figure for 2014/15 was 434. "Rescues" were categorised as being a number of different operations such as "assist other agencies", "affecting entry or exit" (ie. someone being locked out of their premises), "lift release" (being locked in a lift), and "removal of objects from a person". Some of these incidents would have previously required the attendance of a fire engine, however this was felt to be unnecessary and a good usage case for TRVs;
- 41 operational managers had been in place in 2010; this figure was now at 32. It was felt that it would not be possible to reduce this further at this stage. Support staff had been reduced from 148 to 97.

<u>RFU</u>

• The role of a whole-time and a retained firefighter was the same, however whole-time staff were trained for 15 hours per week, whereas retained staff trained for 3 hours per week. Whilst stressing the need for an increased use of retained staff, the "Night Review" did not account for the difficulty of retaining and recruiting retained or "on-call" staff.

Retired Firefighters

- The Service was confident that the consultation had met the "Gunning Principles" and the "Consultation Principles Guidance" document available from the Government. No decision had pre-emptively been made before consulting. A number of staff engagement events had been held across the County attended by 709 members of the public. 2 further events had been scheduled on request;
- All Fire Stations were supplied with posters informing of the consultation and the local consultation event. A lengthy list of stakeholders, agencies and organisations had been written to informing of the consultation. LFRS offered to make this list available to members on request;

Arising from questions from members, the following points were noted:

- The Government had very recently announced that the Department for Communities and Local Government would face a budget cut of 30%. It was unknown to what extent this would affect local government at this stage, however it was expected that this would equate to an 8% year-on-year saving for LFRS, which, unless there was a level of protection for Fire budgets, was worse than that which had been forecast as part of the CFA's Medium Term Financial Strategy;
- Road casualties had recently increased in the County and this was mirrored across the country, though this was known now to be falling. Education would be key to ensuring this continued. Attendance at these incidents would usually require a traditional fire engine as well as another vehicle, dependent on the severity of incident;
- Paper copies of the previous IRMP consultation had been known to be filled out in advance by some interested groups. In an effort to avoid this, it had been intended to run to the consultation as an "online only" exercise. An equality impact assessment had highlighted that this would not be possible and in response, numbered paper copies were made available on request;
- The Fire Authority had spent £40k on last year's IRMP consultation and had taken the view that it would be imprudent to repeat this given the financial position the Authority faced. An independent company had been hired to conduct the process and this had cost in the region of £2k. If any groups had not received a copy of the consultation, the Chief Fire Officer offered to rectify

this outside of the meeting;

- The 10 minute attendance time performance measure responded to the first attending appliance at a scene, including instances where this would be a TRV. It was highlighted that modelling work had shown that there were, on average, two incidents per year in Billesdon where a TRV would not be the first attending appliance;
- A number of other Fire Authorities were known to be using TRVs to a varying degree, such as: West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, Staffordshire, West Midlands, Humberside, Tyne and Wear, Cumbria, Northumberland, Cornwall and Devon and Somerset. It was felt therefore that their use was now well established;
- There would be opportunities to reduce back office and support staff further and these changes would be considered by the CFA in due course. The Service was only required to consult publicly on "operational" changes to the Service;
- LFRS had reached a point at which compulsory redundancy would need to be explored in order to produce a balance budget. This would be a decision for the CFA;
- The Fire Service had approached Leicestershire Police regarding the possibility of sharing their control room. LFRS were also in discussions with other Fire Services regarding collaboration, however it was known that some services had priorities that were at odds with Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland and that therefore, it would not always be possible to achieve savings via this route;
- The timing of equality impact assessments (EIA) for consultation was not set in stone, however it was known that EIAs were usually devised and fine-tuned throughout a consultation process. LFRS had drafted an EIA for the consultation process in advance.

The Chairman thanked the Chief Fire Officer, Deputy Chief Fire Officer and Combined Fire Authority Treasurer for their attendance at the Commission's meeting and the thorough way in which they had provided responses to members' questions.

The following motion was moved by Mr. Sharp CC and seconded by Mr. Charlesworth CC:-

"That the Cabinet be advised as follows:-

- That the Commission finds that the scale of cuts outlined in the proposals present an unnecessary and unacceptable risk to the operational performance of the Combined Fire Authority and that this view is based on evidence that points to:
 - a) A lack of clarity or confidence in the CFA's ability to remove surplus staff that is contributing to over half of its projected deficit with no plausible plan in place to tackle this as a matter of urgency thereby inflating the problem

and creating a real risk that further cost savings attributable to redundancies would not come to fruition;

- b) Opportunities that exist to explore alternative cost reduction proposals that might alleviate the need for the scale of cuts proposed, including but not limited to:
 - i) Greater use of retained firefighters;
 - ii) Extending the 'life' of existing vehicles;
 - iii) Greater collaborative working with local and regional emergency services;
 - iv) Various 'cheaper' staff proposals;
 - v) The sale or lease of the Birstall Headquarters and to decamp to Central Fire Station or another existing building;
 - vi) More appropriate use of Tactical Response Vehicles;
- c) Weaknesses and lack of openness in the modelling of response times which provides real concern at the Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service's ability to respond in a timely manner with the weight of response required;
- d) The process of putting together the IRMP being very exclusive, relying heavily on senior officers and failing to draw on the wide experience within the LFRS;
- e) The consultation being too narrow in its content, having failed to properly contact key stakeholders within and immediately outside the area, being inadequately signposted to the public thereby restricting access to those with internet access and as such not being undertaken in accordance with the 'Gunning principles.
- 2. The Commission therefore urges the Cabinet to:-
 - a) Oppose the proposals and seek an urgent review of alternative cost reduction options to reduce the scale of cuts required from frontline services and for this review to be more inclusive of officers within the CFA;
 - b) Seek from the CFA a clear plan for the early delivery of the resource reduction required to deliver the £1.3million overdue savings;
 - c) Request the CFA to carry out a full and transparent audit of its incident response times including the measurement of appropriate 'weight of response times';
 - d) Request the CFA to commission an "external audit" of future proposals;
 - e) Note that the lack of a scrutiny process within the CFA has impacted negatively on the quality of debate and to recommend that the CFA reviews its scrutiny process."

On the motion being put and before the vote was taken, five members rose asking that a named vote be recorded. The voting was recorded as follows:-

For the motion – Mr. Sharp CC, Mr. Charlesworth CC, Mr. Galton CC, Dr. Hill CC and Ms. Newton CC.

<u>Against the motion</u> – Mr. Shepherd CC, Dr. Feltham CC, Mrs. Camamile CC, Mrs. Dickinson CC, Mr. Jennings CC and Mrs. Radford CC.

The motion was put and not carried.

A further motion was put by Mr. Shepherd CC and seconded by Dr. Feltham CC:-

"That the Cabinet be advised as follows:-

- That the Commission has noted the concerns expressed by the Fire Brigades Union, the Retained Firefighters Union, retired members of the Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service and others about the potential impact of these proposals;
- 2. That the members of the Council and the Scrutiny Commission has received a detailed presentation from the Chief Fire Officer (CFO) and his colleagues on the consultation proposal and would wish to draw the following matters to the Cabinet:
 - i. That there are significant financial pressures on the Combined Fire Authority (CFA) and the consultation proposals should be seen in that context;
 - ii. That the consultation proposals should be seen in the context of a 42% reduction in emergency incident rates in the last 10 years;
 - iii. That the proposals now outlined by the CFO represent his and his management team's professional assessment of the best use of reduced resources to deal with risk;
 - iv. That whilst the CFA previously disestablished 101 operational posts financial provision continues to be made for these posts in the absence of an agreement with the trade unions as to a way forward, a situation which cannot be allowed to continue;
 - v. That the CFA is pressing ahead with proposals for reducing its costs by engaging in shared service agreements and exploring a range of uses by other organisations of office space at its Headquarters."

The motion was put and carried, 6 members voting for the motion and 5 against.

ANNEX A

Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Combined Fire Authority

<u>Medium Term Financial Strategy –</u> <u>Issues and Options</u>

Combined Fire Authority

24th September 2015

(Abridged for Scrutiny Commission, 4 November 2015)

Background

Where have we come from?

Most substantial government funding cuts ever experienced.

LFRS "spending power" is £34/head – lowest of all CFAs.

Second lowest council tax (£60.43).

Budget cuts of £9m approved since 2011/12.

LFRS - Context

<u>Estate</u>

20 Fire Stations

1 HQ

1 Workshop at County Hall

1 Training centre at Loughborough

1 Occupational Health Unit

<u>Vehicles</u>

39 Standard appliances (30 operational) 12 Special appliances

Staff (FTE)

405 Operational firefighters28 Control Staff15 Educational/Fire Protection Staff94 Support staff

Supported by 231 retained firefighters

Budget 2015/16

<u>Budget 15/16 – Key Points</u>

Continuation of grant reductions.

Savings approved in two stages:-

- £2.7m per annum in February 2015
- Subsequent £3.3m from Operational Change Project

Reduction of 101 operational posts approved.

Funding gap of £2.1m by 2019/20.

Summary Budget 2015/16

	<u>£m</u>	<u>£m</u>
<u>Expenditure</u>		
Employee costs		
Operational	22.3	
• Other	4.5	26.8
Running expenses		7.6
Capital financing		2.7
		37.1
<u>Income</u>		
Council tax		18.1
Business rates		3.3
Business rates top up grant		5.0
Revenue Support Grant		8.4
Other grant		1.2
Fees and charges		0.9
	-	36.9

7

Spending Forecasts – Spring 2015

	<u>16/17</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>17/18</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>18/19</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>19/20</u> <u>£m</u>
Spending	35.2	34.8	34.8	35.6
Resources	(35.3)	(34.2)	(33.8)	(33.5)
BUDGET GAP	(0.1)	0.7	0.9	2.1
Add back:-				
Cost of posts disestablished but not vacated	1.0	1.7	1.8	1.3
ACTUAL GAP	0.9	2.4	2.7	3.4

What has happened

since June?

National Funding

Government manifesto:-

- £30bn cuts 16/17 to 17/18
- £12bn from welfare
- £13bn spending cuts
- Budget surplus by 2019/20
- Protection for health and education

Budget, July 2015

Deficit reduction programme will take extra year.

Pace of reductions reduced, especially in 2016/17.

Defence added to protected services.

Public sector wages – 1% increases targeted.

What do we know now?

OBR public spending estimates to 19/20.

No figures for individual government departments.

Government spending review 25th November.

Settlement expected "close to Christmas" – multi-year?

We are able to make assumptions about:-

- Spending on protected services
- Cuts falling on unprotected services

These assumptions are necessarily crude: implications for planning.

National Resource Projections

	<u>15/16</u> <u>£bn</u>	<u>16/17</u> <u>£bn</u>	<u>17/18</u> <u>£bn</u>	<u>18/19</u> <u>£bn</u>	<u>19/20</u> <u>£bn</u>
National spending (OBR)	327.6	331.9	330.3	330.2	334.7
Less protected services	(250.1)	(256.1)	(261.5)	(267.4)	(274.6)
Unprotected services	77.5	75.8	68.8	62.8	60.1
Cuts to unprotected services		2.2%	9.2%	8.8%	4.3%

NB: Protected services will exceed 80% of total by 2019/20.

Government Grant Since 2013/14

	<u>13/14</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>14/15</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>15/16</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>16/17</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>17/18</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>18/19</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>19/20</u> <u>£m</u>
Revenue Support Grant	11.8	10.2	8.4	7.6	5.4	3.5	2.4
Business rates top-up	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.9	5.0	5.1	5.3
Specific grant	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4
Total	17.8	16.3	14.6	13.8	11.7	9.9	9.1
RSG cuts		13.9%	17.7%	9.3%	28.5%	36.1%	30.3%

Overall grant cut of 50% p.a.

Current Forecasts

Spending Forecasts

	<u>16/17</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>17/18</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>18/19</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>19/20</u> <u>£m</u>
Budget 15/16	34.3	33.3	32.5	32.4
Add inflation:-				
• Pay	0.3	0.5	0.8	1.1
• Other	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3
 Savings – 2014/15 Outturn 	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)
Capital Programme cost	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6
Planning Provision	0.3	0.6	0.9	1.2
Budgeted spending	34.6	34.2	34.2	35.0
Add Back				
Cost of posts disestablished but not vacated	1.0	1.7	1.8	1.3
Actual forecast spending	35.6	35.9	36.0	36₄3

Spending Forecasts : Assumptions

All agreed savings delivered!

Inflation:

- Pay rises at 1%
- Price inflation on specific costs only
- No provision for increments
- Pensions increases/contracted out NI

Capital Programme:

• As assumed in July

Operational Staffing:

- No compulsory redundancies
- Use of over-staffing reserve
- Staff leave when entitled to full pension

Inclusion of planning provision

NB: Figures assume no VR or secondment

High Risk Savings already Assumed

Merger of control room with Nottinghamshire – on hold

Telephony charges – awaiting business case

<u>£000</u>	
400	
30	
40	
470	-

2015/16 Budget Savings

New OCP Savings	

Bringing payroll in-house

Resource Forecasts

	<u>16/17</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>17/18</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>18/19</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>19/20</u> <u>£m</u>
Local Resources				
Council Tax	18.4	19.0	19.5	20.1
Business Rates	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.6
Fees and Charges	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
	22.7	23.3	24.0	24.7
<u>Grant</u>	13.8	11.7	9.9	9.1
Total Income	36.4	35.0	33.9	33.8
Grant	37.8%	33.5%	29.3%	27.0%

Resource Forecasts

Assumptions

Council Tax

2.0% tax increases each year (assumed referendum limit)1.0% increase in underlying properties (conservative)

Business Rates

Growth in line with national projections

Revenue Support Grant

Based on assumed cuts in national spending

- 9.3% in 16/17
- 28.5% in 17/18
- 36.1% in 18/19
- 30.3% in 19/20

These assumptions are best current estimates

Spending and Resources Overall Summary

	<u>16/17</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>17/18</u> £m	<u>18/19</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>19/20</u> <u>£m</u>
Budgeted Spending	34.6	34.2	34.2	35.0
Resources	(36.4)	(35.0)	(33.9)	(33.8)
Budgeted Gap/(Surplus)	(1.9)	(0.8)	0.3	1.3
Actual Gap/(Surplus)	(0.9)	0.9	2.1	2.5

<u>NB</u>: These assumptions are volatile and accumulate all forecasting error throughout these slides.

Overstaffing Reserve

	<u>16/17</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>17/18</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>18/19</u> <u>£m</u>	<u>19/20</u> <u>£m</u>
Balance on 1 st April	2.8	3.6	2.8	1.0
Potential addition	1.9	0.8		
Used	(1.0)	(1.7)	(1.8)	(1.0)
Balance on 31 st March	3.6	2.8	1.0	0

Shortfall

0.3

NB: Assumes no departures other than retirees.

All Reserves

	<u>March'15</u> <u>£m</u>
Earmarked reserves:-	
Overstaffing reserve	2.8
 Provision for redundancy 	1.1
Insurance	0.4
• Other	0.7
TOTAL EARMARKED RESERVES	5.0

GENERAL RESERVES

<u>1.8</u>

Potential to add £0.5m to provision for redundancy.

Conclusions

Smaller gap in 19/20 than previously forecast (£1.3m per annum).

Forecast is volatile, and will change.

Maintaining full establishment will exhaust reserves by 2019/20.

Overall position is highly geared.

Some big approved savings are high risk.

Encouraging departures will reduce drain on reserves.

Redundancy more cost effective than commutation.

Sensitivity

High level of gearing – lots of assumptions but budget is close to balance.

Impacts of:-

- 1% less council tax each year £0.8m by 19/20
- RSG cuts 5% greater each year £0.6m by 19/20
- Cessation of fire control merger and operational pooling proposals - £1.3m p.a. in 19/20

ANNEX B

Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Combined Fire Authority

Towards 2020: A Proud and Inspirational Fire and Rescue Service

2016/20 Draft IRMP Proposals

Myth Busting

- Firefighter and public safety will be put at risk 'Cuts Cost Lives'?
- Finance and debt Selling HQ will solve the financial problems?
- Increases in population, dwellings and traffic Capacity to manage increasing number of incidents?
- The reduction in fire engines We will not be able to resource large incidents and will have no resilience?
- Operational effectiveness will be compromised Tactical Response Vehicle's are vans equipped with pressure washers?
- Consultation process It is not legally compliant?

Modelling

Risk Methodology

Externally verified by Risktec – "The work carried out by LFRS in developing the methodology and datasets to produce the Risk Methodology is a robust and comprehensive piece of work, presenting data in a manner which is both transparent and easy to understand."

• Fire Engine Travel Times

Road Type determined by Ordnance Survey Mastermap Integrated Transport Network (ITN)

Road speed is based on a 3 year average of actual road speeds achieved by fire engines responding to incidents


Community Risk Model

Based on lower super output areas (LSOA)

5 years of incident data, including:

- Building fires
- Road traffic collisions
- Life risk special service
- Fatalities
- Casualties

As well as indices of multiple deprivation



Tactical Response Vehicles (TRV)







Example of Tactical Response Vehicles used in other service areas

Specifications:

- Two crew members
- Water capacity between 150 200 litres with foam capability
- Dedicated four wheel drive
- Cost circa £50,000

Advantages:

- Low cost and relatively short lead time compared to standard fire appliances
- Small and versatile off road capable vehicle
- Retains some fire-fighting capability
- Attendance at incidents for scene assessment and intervention, resolving many small incidents
- Multi purpose can be used for Emergency First Responding
- More fuel efficient than standard fire engines
- Fewer crew increases availability, at a lower cost

Tactical Response Vehicles

Used or being considered by (not exhaustive):

- West Midlands
- South Yorkshire
- West Yorkshire
- Humberside
- Devon and Somerset
- Staffordshire
- Tyne and Wear
- Durham and Darlington
- Cheshire

Suited for small fires and initial activity at other incidents. Used in conjunction with traditional fire engines at property fires.


Technical specifications vary dependant on risk profile.

Tactical Response Vehicles

No. and % of incidents per year by station area as well as retained fire engine availability, averaged over five years (2010-15)

Station Area	Primary Property Fires		All Other	Incidents	Total	Retained Fire Engine Availability
Coalville	41.2	8.6%	438	91.4%	479.2	96.5%
Melton Mowbray	33.4	10.7%	277.6	89.3%	311	89.1%
Billesdon	3	6.5%	43.2	93.5%	46.2	74.2%

Fire Engine Demand



Average time spent dealing with incidents

Minutos	Annual	Average
Minutes	No.	Percent
0-15	2991	35.6%
15-30	3342	39.8%
30-60	1470	17.5%
60-120	442	5.3%
120-240	85	1.0%
240+	71	0.8%
Total	8402	100.0%


Based on time of call to time stop message received


Loughborough Incident Profile

Incident Type	1	2	3	4	5	5+	Total
False Alarm	196.8	131.6	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	330.8
Primary Fire	37.6	45.6	5.6	1.0	0.5	0.8	91.1
Secondary Fire	82.4	6.6	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	89.2
Special Service Other	62.0	13.2	0.8	0.2	0.0	0.0	76.2
Special Service RTC	11.2	20.4	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	32.2
Grand Total	390.0	217.4	9.6	1.2	0.5	0.8	619.5

Central Incident Profile

Incident Type	1	2	3	4	5	5+	Total
False Alarm	342.0	217.4	123.8	113.8	1.4	0.0	798.4
Primary Fire	34.0	43.0	29.8	13.6	3.4	1.6	125.4
Secondary Fire	157.2	6.0	1.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	165.0
Special Service Other	123.8	16.4	1.4	0.4	0.2	0.0	142.2
Special Service RTC	14.8	19.2	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	34.4
Grand Total	671.8	302.0	156.8	128.2	5.0	1.6	1265.4





Consultation Activity

Consultation commenced 25 September 2015, closes 4 December 2015 (10 weeks)

Communicated electronically through email, social media and website

Over 2,100 stakeholders contacted via email including business, community and statutory organisations

Over 10,000 accessed details via Facebook

10 Public Engagement Events attracting approximately 710 attendees

2 additional events planned at Coalville and Loughborough in November

Wholetime and On-Call employees engaged with

Extensive press coverage

Consultation – Responses

Key Points from Engagement Events:

- Increase in council tax precept
- Government funding reductions
- Fewer resources affecting resilience
- Other fire and rescue authorities shrinking reducing support
- Fewer firefighters available
- No fire engines within the city centre
- Tactical Response Vehicles are untested and is not a fire engine
- Unsighted on rejected proposals
- Headquarters options of use

Consultation – Responses

Responses received as at 3 November 2015 are as follows:

- 1,088 Questionnaires submitted
- 13 Freedom of Information requests

89 Enquiries of which:

61 Emails

14 Phone calls

8 Letters

- 3 Social media comments
- 3 Visits

Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland Combined Fire Authority

Towards 2020: A Proud and Inspirational Fire and Rescue Service

2016/20 Draft IRMP Proposals

<u>Leicestershire FBU Briefing Note on Leicestershire Fire</u> <u>Service Cuts</u>

ANNF

Foreword

Like the vast majority of firefighters and members of the public, the FBU were shocked and angered by the scale of the solely front line cuts proposed in last month's announcement by Leicestershire Fire Service management. Particularly in light of the previous cuts agreed by the Combined Fire Authority (CFA) in April of this year, which amounted to the removal of 104 Operational Firefighters and 2 Fire Engines.

In this latest round of cuts, the worst ever faced in the history of Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS), the following further devastating cuts have been put forward for consultation:

- The closure of Central Fire Station the busiest station in the county.
- The closure of Kibworth Fire Station that will leave a rural community with little or no fire cover.
- A further reduction of 88 Operational Firefighters, in addition to the 102 already agreed, taking the total reduction to a staggering <u>192</u> out of the <u>650</u> Firefighters we currently have. <u>This constitutes a loss of 1/3</u> of all operational firefighters in Leicestershire; taking this to the lowest number since pre First World War times.
- <u>The removal of a further 9 Fire Engines</u> taking the <u>total to 11 that will be</u> <u>removed</u> out the 30 we currently operate with, <u>leaving just 19</u> for the entire county.
- Introduction of 3 small fire units (TRV's) which are untried and untested in Leicestershire and will be crewed with just 2 Firefighters and a fraction of the equipment of a fully kitted Fire Engine. 3 TRV's are being proposed to replace 3 of the 11 fully equipped Fire Engines that are being removed.

What does all of this ACTUALLY mean to the public of Leicestershire...?



Response times WILL be slower

For firefighters, response should be measured in both <u>speed</u> and <u>weight</u> of attack, speed being the time it takes to get the 1st attending appliance in attendance, weight being the time it takes to get sufficient crews and resources there to safely carryout a rescue or deal with an incident.

In the Central Station area and Kibworth Station area these proposals would mean that the speed of the first attending appliance would be significantly delayed, often doubled in the city especially during times of busy traffic.

The proposals at Loughborough, Hinckley and Market Harborough would mean that although the speed of attack would not always be delayed, the weight of attack would be significantly delayed, the position of surrounding appliances DOES NOT mean that there will be sufficient crews in attendance to carry out initial lifesaving actions, crews would literally have to WAIT before taking some action or carrying out a rescue, which is unacceptable.

The argument that there would be an upgrade in fire cover in Market Harborough is misleading, the speed of the first attending appliance might be slightly quicker, but they would actually have half the current resources so their actions would be limited, they would frequently have to wait before they have sufficient resources to act. This is a prime example why 'weight' of attack is vital.

Tactical Response Vehicles are NOT capable of ANY lifesaving action

They are basically a pick up van, crewed with just 2 Firefighters with a jet wash fitted to the back. Amazingly LFRS plan to send this vehicle to all incident types, including house fires and high-rise incidents, very much against what they are designed to do.

Firefighters are very proud that their hard work has resulted in the number of calls reducing nationally, however the county trend is that rescues are on the rise. Therefore We NEED appliances that are capable of carrying out rescues WHEN THEY ARRIVE, TRV's do not have the equipment or sufficient crew to carry out ANY rescues.

Imagine in Billesdon or Kibworth, you are a firefighter first to arrive at a house fire in a TRV where a family is trapped inside, family members are screaming at you to rescue their loved ones. There are only 2 of you, you have just 1 breathing apparatus set and a hose that amounts to just a jet wash, you know that under every procedure locally and nationally it requires you to WAIT for supporting appliances, but you know they could be another 5 – 10 minutes and people are dying.....what would you do....wait?....or have a go? This is the dilemma that firefighters could have to face EVERY DAY. Massively increasing the risk to the public and firefighters.



Resilience reduced to dangerous levels

Reducing from 30 Fire Appliances to just 19, and 3 TRV's is a reduction of 1/3 of our firefighting capability.

Fire and Rescue Services are required to plan for **ALL** potential incidents. Clearly an incident such as the Kegworth air disaster does not occur frequently, however Leicestershire do frequently attend incidents that require a level of response that we would not be capable of providing if these proposals are agreed. You will remember the Melton Road Fire that required 10 Fire Engines, Jayplas that required 16 or the high rise incident only last week that required 5, even an Automatic Fire Alarm at a high rise requires 4 appliances to attend. When incidents do occur all resources would be used up very quickly, the closure of Central Station for example would frequently pull all the Fire Engines from the county into the city, leaving these areas exposed and not leaving anything else to deal with ANY other lifesaving incident should they occur.

It is true that we can call upon our neighbouring Fire & Rescue Services for assistance, but this all takes time to put into place. Appliances will be constantly on the move to back fill others, leaving their area vulnerable. This happening at a time when all of our neighbouring services are facing significant cuts.

Warwickshire for example have a policy not to commit anybody into a fire wearing Breathing Apparatus unless there are at least 2 of their appliances in attendance. Therefore, the arguments that (Warwickshire) Nuneaton could cover the Hinckley area if their 2nd appliance is removed is a flawed and misleading argument.

The closure of Central in conjunction with the loss of Western Station's second Fire Engine on Aikman Avenue amounts to a **50% cut in fire cover in the city of Leicester**. This means 6 Fire Engines would be cut to a devastatingly inadequate amount of just 3 Fire Engines, to cover a city with a population of 330,000 and rising.

The City (Central, Eastern and Western Station) currently receive well over 5000 calls a year, which is over half of the whole counties calls. This means there is often a number of incidents at any one time in the city. Therefore to have a high-rise incident, along with a house fire at the same time can easily tie up 7/8 Fire Engines, meaning fire engines would have to be travelling in from outside the city, and from rural areas in some cases, causing further delays to the public who need us most. This very likely 'multiple call factor' in the city has not been adequately addressed by LFRS and it could have devastating consequences to the public.



Alternatives NOT explored sufficiently

There have been many alternatives suggested by councillors, employees and most recently retired senior officers. Despite a cross party letter from Leicestershire MP's asking management to explore alternatives with representative bodies, this has not happened and these ill-conceived proposals were produced with NO consultation whatsoever in their development.

Currently LFRS has a half empty, unneeded and expensive £11 million Headquarters at Birstall. We propose to sell HQ and relocate the small team from HQ to the empty offices at Central, requesting through DCLG to use the funds as a transformational budget to allow us to do much more collaborative working.

Use Fire as a Health Asset. Firefighters frequently enter people's homes to carry out Fire Safety checks, this presents opportunities' to take on additional roles. There is so much work we could take on from the Health Service which could be funded.

Share ALL support departments with either Council or other Emergency Services such as the Police and EMAS. Departments like HR, IT, Estates, Finance, Corporate Communication could all be shared.

Reduce or share senior management roles. If they are proposing to reduce the service by 1/3, then surely Senior Officers should be cut by 1/3, particularly when they collectively cost £1/2 million pound a year. Which is equivalent to running a day crewed Fire Station for the same period.

ALL of LFRS' proposals are FRONTLINE, and will result in 1/3 less fire cover for the public, which will clearly compromise public safety. Before ANY such proposals went forward, all non-front line options (mentioned above) should have been fully exhausted – which disappointingly has not occurred.

Financial situation has been exaggerated

Attached to this document is the 'Medium Term Financial Strategy' presented to the CFA during the meeting on 24th September. This was presented immediately before the proposals were.

Page 10 shows the spending forecasts 2016 – 2020. It has been identified that there is no statutory requirement to have this forecasted 'Planning Provision' seen half way down this page.

If this expenditure is removed this would make a significant change to the deficit figures, leaving little requirement to make further cuts.



Page 18 concludes that the merger of control room with Nottinghamshire is 'on hold' and we have been informed that this is unlikely to proceed simply because the two services cannot agree on the governance of this. This is entirely unacceptable.

Finally, Page 23 identifies £6.8 million reserves. The 'General Reserve' (£1.8 million) is a 5% reserve in place in case of a significant protracted incident. It has NEVER been used. Many other services have made the decision to reduce this to just 2%, releasing £1 million. This would go a significant way to fund the cost/risks of a referendum to raise Leicestershire Council Tax precept.

<u>Referendum</u>

Leicestershire is the lowest council tax precept of any Fire Authority in the country, it cannot be right that we are feeling the impact of government funding cuts more than others simply because of this fact.

Just an additional 60p per household per month would remove the necessity to find any further savings. In a recent survey by the Leicester Mercury 93% of the public stated that they would be happy to pay this.

A joint referendum with the PCC referendum next year would significantly reduce the costs. In addition, the potential £1 million from the 'general reserve' could underwrite any risk of rebilling in the unlikely situation that a referendum is lost.

Conclusion

We hope that this briefing demonstrates to you that not only are these proposals extremely dangerous to the public of Leicestershire but also that the financial situation has been exaggerated and there are many alternatives that could make these cuts entirely unnecessary.

These proposals are neither PROPORTIONATE OR SAFE, and must be <u>REJECTED</u> before any LIVES ARE LOST as a result of this ill-thought out plan.

ANNEX D

RFU Interim Response to Leicestershire Fire & Rescue Service's draft IRMP

The following is a brief summary of our concerns relating to the draft IRMP proposals as contained in the draft IRMP.

The details surrounding Leicestershire's proposals are contained in 4.2 of the attached LFRS report:

The proposals that are being presented are:

- 1. Remove one of the two wholetime crewed fire engines from **Loughborough** fire station.
- 2. Close **Central** fire station and sell the building.
- *3. Establish* **Market Harborough** as a single fire engine wholetime crewed fire station.
- 4. Revise existing plans to introduce the Day Crewing Plus duty system at **Wigston**fire station by establishing a two wholetime crewed fire engine station.
- 5. As a consequence of establishing the revised crewing arrangements at **Wigston** and **Market Harborough**, close **Kibworth** fire station and sell the building.
- 6. Establish **Lutterworth** as a wholetime crewed single fire engine fire station. Wholetime fire engine to be crewed between 0700 hours and 1900 hours Monday to Friday. On-call cover will be maintained outside of these hours.
- 7. Replace the on-call fire engines at **Melton** and **Coalville** fire stations with Tactical Response Vehicles.
- 8. Replace the fire engine at **Billesdon** fire station with a Tactical Response Vehicle.
- 9. Remove the on-call fire engine from **Hinckley** fire station.

It would appear that the service wishes to justify changes to Wholetime stations, which would reduce the Wholetime establishment (*Loughborough and Central*) by moving these Wholetime posts to other locations which are currently RDS, thus removing the need for Wholetime compulsory redundancies.

Last year **Loughborough** only responded to 289 calls, excluding False Alarms (FAs) at a cost of **£6,656** per call. Yet the proposal is to have a Wholetime appliance at the station - why? 50% of all station calls last year were to FAs. The cost of the station last year was just under £2m. The potential for savings at this station is huge by using a duty system other than the inflexible 4-shift system. Such a change would not increase risk by any notable amount (if any).

Last year 64% of **Central's** calls were false alarms. Non-false alarm calls totalled 481.

Market Harborough responded to 82 calls last year (exc. FAs) yet the service proposes to transfer a Wholetime establishment to the station - why? The cost per call at Market Harborough was just **£3,082** last year.

Wigston only responded to 206 calls last year (exc. FAs) at a cost of **£6,133** per call. The Day Crewing Plus (DCP) model clearly isn't what is needed here.

Kibworth has a lower rate of FAs (32%), and cost only **£2,754** per call last year (exc. FAs), why close this station other than to attempt to justify the Wholetime establishments within the surrounding areas?

Lutterworth is the second most cost-effective station behind **Ashby**, costing only **£1,795** per call last year (exc. FAs). FAs were at the lower end of the scale at 38% yet the proposal is to place a Wholetime crew here from 0900-1700 Mon-Fri. Is there high risk during these periods? Does the risk reduce outside of these periods? Will a Wholetime crew at Lutterworth stop incidents occurring compared to a Retained crew? The answer to all these questions is no. So what is the real reason for the proposal?

There is no justification to replace generic fire appliances with small Tactical Response Vehicles (TRVs) at **Coalville** and **Melton Mowbray**. TRVs may be the lasted fad within principle officers across the country but it is hard to see how such a change provides any real benefit, TRVs may be useful in areas such as the West Midlands but to compare a metropolitan service with Leicestershire is not appropriate.

Again, our view is that the proposed change is to reduce the number of call types these appliances can attend and justify other changes across the service by increasing their number of calls.

We see no justification to remove the **Hinckley** appliance that responded to 200 calls last year (exc. FAs) at a cost of £4,211 per call last year.

We appreciate call levels, call type and cost are not the only considerations to be used when formulating changes within an IRMP but they are primary issues.

The consultation document does not demonstrate any significant risk to justify the current proposals and neither do these proposals contain measures to overcome appliance availability issues at any of the RDS stations that are experiencing difficulty or state how having a Wholetime establishment at a specific station somehow reduces risk; two major points relevant when taking into account public safety and best value for the taxpayer.

There are plenty of opportunities to better utilise the Retained workforce in Leicestershire and reduce the need to rely on some Wholetime establishments which would realise massive savings, the exact thing the proposals are supposed to identify.

We note that the proposals do not contain any station costs which seems odd considering that the main reason for the proposals was to identify savings.

All the figures are as a direct result of a FOI request to the service. The only figures that have been formulated are the costs per call which are calculated using the service's own data.

We would also like to make reference to Sir Ken Knight's Report, 'Facing the Future', which made a number of recommendations including a better utilisation of Retained firefighters. It appears from the contents of the draft IRMP that the service disagrees with Sir Ken's report, is this the first of the Fire Authority?

Anthony Morgan RFU President

ANNEX E

Retired Members of LFRS Open Letter

Summary Document

Concerns and Suggested Alternative Measures for 2016-2020 IRMP

Concern that public opinion is not seriously taken into consideration following consultation.

Concern that the consultation period it too short and fails to comply with Government guidance,

Concern that the consultation is insufficiently well targeted and fails to reach those people the exercise is intended to reach.

Concerns that the consultation does not allow for appropriate comment on each of the proposals and is very limiting in the single comment box that is provided.

Concern that the consultation process is not in accordance with the Gunning Principles

Concerns that CFA decision making resides with a small executive; that there is no scrutiny of decisions and that elected members may have insufficient training for them to form opinion on issues raised in IRMP proposals.

The CFA and the Chief Fire Officer should explore the idea of a council tax increase in support of LFRS.

Fire and rescue Service HQ should be sold in order to reduce the debt burden on LFRS.

That fire cover should be maintained in the City centre, head quarters staff to be relocated to Central station and other locations if required.

Fire appliances coming to the end of their lease period should be purchased by the Service (a comparatively minimal cost compared to that of a new vehicle) and be retained in service for a further 5 years.

TRV's are not a suitable front line appliance and suggest that the two pumps ear-marked for removal in the 2015-2020 IRMP be redeployed in place of TRV's.

Consideration to be given to establishing day duty staff at retained stations and use them to bolster retained availability.

LFRS to enter into discussion with representative bodies in order to explore the future of day crewing plus and its funding.

We suggest that LFRS explore opportunities for transitional funding in support of greater collaborative working with EMAS and other health agencies.

Considerable financial savings can be made by curtailment of wasteful expenditure on things such as LFRS cars, uniform and uniform embellishments which appear to be subject to frequent and unnecessary change.

Dated 23 October

Is it not possible for a rescue vehicle-based at Kibworth?

As you are stating you don't attend so many fires anymore as trapped people. Where you need thing like cutting equipment.

Pauline Lindsay

Kibworth Harcourt Parish Councillor



ANNEX G

COMMUNITY RISK MODEL // 2014 f ど in

www.leicestershire-fire.gov.uk

safer communities

INTRODUCTION

This report is a detailed account of the components of the risk model which has been developed by Leicestershire Fire and Rescue Service (LFRS). The model assesses risk factors in order to identify localities where we are more likely to attend serious fires and other emergencies, relative to other localities. Output from the model is used to inform decisions about the allocation of resources throughout our area for the Integrated Risk Management Plan (2015-20).

RISK MODEL

The risk presents a balanced view of relative risk. Relative risk means that we can determine that one locality is more at risk than another, but are be able to quantify the precise amount of risk. The risk model provides a general view of risk; it does not take into account personal circumstances; i.e. not everyone living in a very high risk locality will be equally at risk. Relative risk prioritises localities for resource provision and allocation.

Time Period

The model is based on five years of incident data covering the period April 2009 – March 2014, which at the time of writing is the most recent dataset available. It balances the reduction in incident volumes (data) with the introduction of the new Incident Recording System in April 2008. The data has consequently been recorded in a consistent manner; is sufficient to build a statistically robust model, and reflects current rather than historical demand.

Geographic Level

Risk is profiled at Lower Super Output Area 2011 (LSOA) level; this is a standard unit of geography based on population size and contains areas with similar types of housing and property ownership. On average, each LSOA contains 1,500 people and 600 households; the size will vary depending on how densely populated the area is. A densely populated urban area will have smaller LSOAs than less populated rural areas. LSOAs are the lowest level of geography available to identify pockets of higher risk in lower risk areas, and at the same time be statistically valid.

Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD 2010)

Deprivation is defined as the damaging lack of material benefits considered to be basic necessities, and is linked to fires and other emergency incidents. IMD is composed of numerous datasets which form seven domains: health, education, employment, crime, housing, environment and income. These are weighted and aggregated to create a total deprivation score per LSOA. IMD is a relative measure i.e. one area is more deprived than another but it cannot be said by how much. It is updated every 3-4 years, with the next update due in summer 2015.

Methodology

The methodology involves calculating the percentage value per LSOA for each of 6 different datasets, applying weightings and summing the result to create a risk score per LSOA. The score is then allocated one of 5 bands i.e. Very Low, Low, Medium, High and Very High. The main steps for determining and subsequently calculating the risk scores are:

- Extract incident data for datasets (specified below) from the Incident Recording System
- Extract Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010 scores for 2011 LSOAs (sourced from the Association of Public Health Observatories)
- Import incident datasets into a geographical information system so that every incident is allocated to a LSOA based on its geographical coordinates
- Import updated datasets into a spreadsheet, add IMD data and calculate the percentage value for each dataset per LSOA
- Weight each of the datasets (see section below) and sum the scores to create a final risk score per LSOA
- Split LSOAs into 5 bands by taking the average (mean and median) of the risk scores and dividing this by the mid-point

DATASETS

The model is based on fire casualty and fatality data and incidents which are more likely to result in serious injury or loss of life. These include domestic and commercial fires, road traffic collisions and special service life risk incidents i.e. water and rope rescues. It also contains IMD data in order to adequately reflect risk in terms of people who are more likely to need our services.

The model consists of the following data categories taken for the period April 2009 – March 2014:

Data Category	Definition and Rationale
Dwelling fires	Incidents in domestic properties irrespective of the cause of fire. Excludes such fires in derelict buildings or chimney fires. Dwelling fires form the largest proportion of all building fires and with 7% of incidents resulting in death or injury requiring hospitalisation, it has the highest percentage of casualties.
Commercial fires	Incidents in buildings that are used for commercial or public purposes irrespective of the cause of fire; excludes such fires in derelict buildings or chimney fires. Commercial fires represent a significant drain to operational capability and preparedness due to the potential of any one incident to result in a higher number of casualties.
Fire casualties	Incidents in buildings where casualties either died or were injured and required hospitalisation, irrespective of the cause of the fire. Excludes deaths which were not fire related. Incident data was preferred over casualty data to avoid double counting where one incident accounts for multiple casualties; it was used to place greater emphasis on casualties.
Road traffic collisions	Incidents involving road vehicles where casualties needed to be rescued (extricated) from their vehicles. Excludes incidents where crews only gave advice, did not take action, made the scene or vehicle safe or released casualties from vehicles without the need for extrication. RTC incidents have the highest percentage of incidents resulting in casualties.
Special service life risk	 Selection of incidents with a higher percentage of injury or death including: Assist other agencies e.g. assisting the Ambulance Service with bariatric patients – all subcategories Affecting entry or exit e.g. person trapped in room – for medical case or person in distress only Other rescue e.g. person trapped under machinery – all subcategories Other transport incident e.g. removing vehicles from ditches – all subcategories Removal of people from objects – e.g. freeing trapped limbs – all subcategories Suicide – all subcategories Water rescue – e.g. person fallen into lake – for person at immediate risk only
IMD 2010	There is an established link between fire incidents and deprivation. IMD provides a predictive aspect by taking into account some of the influencing factors that contribute to the probability for an emergency incident to occur. A key requirement for any risk assessment model is for it to be periodically and routinely reviewed and updated to enable relevant changes over time. IMD is updated regularly and is available at LSOA level.

WEIGHTINGS

Probability states that for every incident, a small proportion will result in injuries and an even smaller proportion will result in death. The risk weightings applied in our model build on national research and have in certain cases, been amended to reflect our local priorities and incident profile. This will vary between incident types and the weightings reflect both the Probability and Severity of an incident. The weightings used in the model are:

Data Category	Weighting	Reasons
Dwelling fires	1.9	These incidents have the highest weighting as they are used to represent the potential for injury or death resulting from all fire incidents. Our statistics show that over the past 5 financial years, 1% of dwelling fires result in a death(s) and 6% result in a casualty(s) requiring hospitalisation. The respective figures for all fire incidents are 0.2% resulting in death(s) and 1.5% resulting in a casualty(s).
IMD 2010	1.5	This has been given a higher weighting due to the importance of representing the underlying people and lifestyle risk factors that contribute to the frequency of fire related incidents.
Road traffic collisions	1.0	RTC incidents have been weighted more highly than other special service life risk incidents due to the higher percentage of incidents which result in death or injury. The weighting is lower than that applicable to dwelling fires because fewer incidents are attended compared to fires overall. Our statistics show that over the past 5 financial years 2.8% of RTC incidents resulted in a death(s) and 48.2% in an injury(s) requiring hospitalisation.
Fire injuries and deaths	0.46	The low weighting reflects the fact that only a very small percentage of people are injured as a result of incidents and fortunately; an even a smaller proportion of incidents result in death.
Special service life risk	0.35	This data category is taken as a representation of all injuries due to other special service incident categories. The lower weighting reflects the fact that only a small percentage result in death(s) and/or injury(s).
Commercial fires	0.25	The low weighting reflects the fact that only a small percentage of fires occur in such premises and in general, statutory compliance with fire protection duties reduces the overall level of risk.

BANDING

Each LSOA has been allocated one of five bands based on its total risk score. The bands were created using multiples of the average, based on the midpoint between the mean and median. This method best reflects the range of scores, balancing high numbers of low scoring LSOAs with low numbers of high scoring LSOAs, ensuring the bands are not too wide. For example, the table below shows that more than half of LSOAs are in the very low or low bands and only 4% of LSOAs are in the high or very high bands.

Band	Risk Score	No. LSOA	% LSOA
Very High	3.23-5.18	4	1%
High	2.42-3.23	20	3%
Medium	1.61-2.42	47	8%
Low	0.81-1.61	198	32%
Very Low	0.00-0.81	342	56%

Table 1. The number and percentage of LSOAs allocated to each band

The bandings indicate the likelihood of LFRS attending an LSOA for serious incidents, compared to all other LSOAs. So, for a very small percentage of the population there is a higher likelihood that LFRS will turn out to a serious emergency incident in their area relative to other areas. Conversely, for the majority of the population the likelihood of LFRS turning out to an incident is lower than other areas.

EXTERNAL VALIDATION


The model was externally validated by Risktec Solutions Ltd., a professional international risk management company, in July 2014. The conclusion of their report was that: 'The work carried out by LFRS in developing the methodology and datasets to produce the Risk Methodology is a robust and comprehensive piece of work, presenting data in a manner which is both transparent and easy to understand'. (p.8)

REVIEW PROCESS

The resource priority map will continue to be reviewed periodically to ensure the methodology accurate reflects the incident profile and incorporates any new developments in national research.

MAP 1. RESOURCE PRIORITY PROFILE

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Interpretation

The profile identifies localities (LSOAs) based on the likelihood of attending a serious emergency incident, relative to all other localities in our area. The model does not take into account personal circumstances (not everybody in a very high priority locality will be at equal risk). In addition people in very low priority areas will still receive an adequate level of resources.

Breakdown of LSOAs by Local Authority

Local Authority	VERY LOW	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	VERY HIGH	Total
Blaby	45	14	0	1	0	60
Charnwood	68	26	3	1	1	99
Harborough	31	10	5	1	0	47
Hinckley and Bosworth	46	17	3	0	0	66
Leicester	66	78	32	13	3	192
Melton	17	11	1	1	0	30
North West Leicestershire	29	25	2	2	0	58
Oadby and Wigston	28	7	0	1	0	36
Rutland	14	7	2	0	0	23
Total	344	191	54	18	4	611

Breakdown of Very High and High LSOAs

LSOA	Containing Ward	Local Authority	Risk Score	Risk Band
E01013647	Castle Ward	Leicester	5.18	Very High
E01032867	Castle Ward	Leicester	3.55	Very High
E01025699	Loughborough Hastings Ward	Charnwood	3.45	Very High
E01013646	Castle Ward	Leicester	3.26	Very High
E01025808	Misterton Ward	Harborough	3.22	High
E01013726	New Parks Ward	Leicester	3.06	High
E01013730	New Parks Ward	Leicester	2.99	High
E01013654	Charnwood Ward	Leicester	2.93	High
E01025992	Wigston All Saints Ward	Oadby and Wigston	2.90	High
E01025944	Kegworth and Whatton Ward	North West Leicestershire	2.87	High
E01025934	Greenhill Ward	North West Leicestershire	2.83	High
E01013607	Abbey Ward	Leicester	2.81	High
E01032873	Castle Ward	Leicester	2.79	High
E01013746	Spinney Hills Ward	Leicester	2.72	High
E01025718	Loughborough Southfields Ward	Charnwood	2.71	High
E01013603	Abbey Ward	Leicester	2.70	High
E01013622	Beaumont Leys Ward	Leicester	2.67	High
E01013637	Braunstone Park and Rowley Fields Ward	Leicester	2.64	High
E01025627	Enderby and St. John's Ward	Blaby	2.63	High
E01013648	Castle Ward	Leicester	2.59	High
E01013621	Beaumont Leys Ward	Leicester	2.54	High
E01013655	Charnwood Ward	Leicester	2.53	High
E01013720	Latimer Ward	Leicester	2.50	High
E01025894	Melton Craven Ward	Melton	2.49	High

ANNEX H

Tactical Response Vehicle (TRV)

The TRV that is being used as part of a pilot in Rutland benefits from the following levels of equipment being available:



On board 200 litre water tank Ultra high pressure hosereel 30 metre hose Dry Powder extinguisher Thermal Image Camera Standpipe , key and bar, Tank fill length Multi use ladder Breathing Apparatus set Line/rope

Road Cones

Blue flashing lamps

Cordless E-draulic Combination Cutting / Spreading tool

Cordless Impact Wrench

Cordless Reciprocating Saw

Crowbar

Sledgehammer

Stability blocks and wedges

Emergency First Responding Equipment:

- Defibrillator
- Oxygen
- Airway Management
- Burns kit
- Traditional first Aid equipment



2014-15		
Cat1(T)	Account(T)	Amount
Castle Donington Station	Operational Pay	357,268.78
Castle Donington Station	Operational Overtime	1,615.46
Castle Donington Station	Operational NI	29,468.67
Castle Donington Station	Operational Superannuation	69,679.64
Castle Donington Station		458,032.55
Birstall Fire Station	Operational Pay	534,734.44
Birstall Fire Station	Operational Overtime	2,183.69
Birstall Fire Station	Operational NI	43,966.65
Birstall Fire Station	Operational Superannuation	105,483.56
Birstall Fire Station		686,368.34
Loughborough	Operational Pay	1,531,514.34
Loughborough	Operational Overtime	9,786.91
Loughborough	Operational NI	114,242.33
Loughborough	Operational Superannuation	268,282.15
Loughborough		1,923,825.73
Melton Mowbray	Operational Pay	419,289.79
Melton Mowbray	Operational Overtime	2,011.19
Melton Mowbray	Operational NI	34,391.01
Melton Mowbray	Operational Superannuation	60,980.64
Melton Mowbray	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	157,069.31
Melton Mowbray	Retained Firefighters NI	8,371.71
Melton Mowbray	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	13,957.59
Melton Mowbray		696,071.24
Eastern	Operational Pay	1,441,974.52
Eastern	Operational Overtime	8,960.25
Eastern	Operational NI	109,165.61
Eastern	Operational Superannuation	232,587.55
Eastern		1,792,687.93
Western	Operational Pay	1,358,351.77
Western	Operational Overtime	14,110.34

Total Calls	Exc. False Alarms	Cost per call (ex. FAs)
35%	of all calls were false alarms	
81	53	£8,642.12
50%	of all calls were false alarms	
313	157	£4,371.77
50%	of all calls were false alarms	
577	289	£6,656.84
38%	of all calls were false alarms	
268	166	£4,193.20
52%	of all calls were false alarms	
816	391	£4,584.88
42%	of all calls were false alarms	

42% of all calls were false alarms

Western	Operational NI	97,306.65
Western	Operational Superannuation	212,225.42
Western		1,681,994.18
Coalville	Operational Pay	597,208.46
Coalville	Operational Overtime	2,103.02
Coalville	Operational NI	51,025.97
Coalville	Operational Superannuation	107,987.67
Coalville	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	156,640.65
Coalville	Retained Firefighters NI	9,484.51
Coalville	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	8,931.88
Coalville		933,382.16
Ashby	Operational Pay	182.29
Ashby	Operational Superannuation	86.40
Ashby	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	134,139.92
Ashby	Retained Firefighters NI	6,378.38
Ashby	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	11,182.15
Ashby		151,969.14
Moira	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	92,125.59
Moira	Retained Firefighters NI	3,394.33
Moira	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	3,568.01
Moira		99,087.93
Shepshed	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	163,114.89
Shepshed	Retained Overtime	988.08
Shepshed	Retained Firefighters NI	9,865.24
Shepshed	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	11,991.18
Shepshed		185,959.39
Central	Operational Pay	1,663,950.25
Central	Operational Overtime	18,273.83
Central	Operational NI	128,749.87
Central	Operational Superannuation	301,947.96
Central		2,112,921.91
Wigston	Operational Pay	928,124.66

	<u></u>	
1075	628	£2,678.33
51% of	all calls were false alarms	
405	200	£4,666.91
		•
47% of	all calls were false alarms	
167	89	£1,707.52
23% of	all calls were false alarms	
20	22	64 200 47
30	23	£4,308.17
65% of	all calls were false alarms	
75	26	£7,152.28
	all as lla success for the sale of	
64% Of	all calls were false alarms	
1346	481	£4,392.77

		1
Wigston	Operational Overtime	5,368.98
Wigston	Operational NI	68,388.27
Wigston	Operational Superannuation	137,597.69
Wigston	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	109,497.83
Wigston	Retained Overtime	92.13
Wigston	Retained Firefighters NI	6,937.19
Wigston	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	7,545.19
Wigston		1,263,551.94
Billesdon	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	75,486.13
Billesdon	Retained Firefighters NI	1,772.04
Billesdon	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	5,913.08
Billesdon		83,171.25
Oakham	Operational Pay	579,963.39
Oakham	Operational Overtime	2,312.95
Oakham	Operational NI	49,003.59
Oakham	Operational Superannuation	112,731.34
Oakham	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	81,851.13
Oakham	Retained Overtime	20.94
Oakham	Retained Firefighters NI	2,617.67
Oakham	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	8,248.90
Oakham		836,749.91
Uppingham	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	71,897.92
Uppingham	Retained Overtime	281.59
Uppingham	Retained Firefighters NI	1,217.80
Uppingham	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	6,217.57
Uppingham		79,614.88
Kibworth	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	102,663.58
Kibworth	Retained Overtime	4.46
Kibworth	Retained Firefighters NI	5,234.92
Kibworth	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	10,535.94
Kibworth		118,438.90
Market Harborough	Operational Pay	47,960.64

407	206	£6,133.75
32% (of all calls were false alarms	
28	19	£4,377.43
55% (of all calls were false alarms	
214	96	£8,716.14
56% (of all calls were false alarms	
68	30	£2,653.83
37% (of all calls were false alarms	
68	43	£2,754.39

49% of all calls were false alarms

Market Harborough	Operational NI	4,378.65
Market Harborough	Operational Superannuation	10,036.10
Market Harborough	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	172,892.06
Market Harborough	Retained Firefighters NI	6,814.95
Market Harborough	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	10,669.17
Market Harborough		252,751.57
Lutterworth	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	144,939.80
Lutterworth	Retained Overtime	577.99
Lutterworth	Retained Firefighters NI	8,538.37
Lutterworth	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	12,893.32
Lutterworth		166,949.48
Hinckley	Operational Pay	602,097.95
Hinckley	Operational Overtime	1,486.13
Hinckley	Operational NI	49,615.25
Hinckley	Operational Superannuation	117,878.63
Hinckley	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	101,027.91
Hinckley	Retained Firefighters NI	6,078.74
Hinckley	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	6,199.08
Hinckley		884,383.69
Mkt Bosworth	Retained Firefighters Retaining Fees	109,764.64
Mkt Bosworth	Retained Overtime	31.37
Mkt Bosworth	Retained Firefighters NI	6,547.18
Mkt Bosworth	Retained Firefighters Superannuation	5,824.83
Mkt Bosworth		122,168.02
Southern	Operational Pay	983,368.83
Southern	Operational Overtime	12,165.43
Southern	Operational NI	78,396.07
Southern	Operational Superannuation	159,599.58
Southern		1,233,529.91
		15,763,610.05

56% c	56% of all calls were false alarms						
185	82	£3,082.34					
38% c	of all calls were false alarms						
150	93	£1,795.16					
49% c	f all calls were false alarms						
409	210	£4,211.35					
22% c	of all calls were false alarms						
86	67	£1,823.40					
46% c	of all calls were false alarms						
563	304	£4,057.66					

Total LFRS - Retained Appliance Availability ANNEX J

Period	Appliance Availability						
						Below Minim	Crewing
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Crewing	Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical*	Crewing*	% Available	Retained**	Action**
Aug-14	10416.00	2260.16	22.85	2237.31	78.30%	1636.72	434.38
Sep-14	10080.00	1692.27	12.69	1679.58	83.21%	1458.33	0.00
Oct-14	10416.00	1752.83	10.12	1742.71	83.17%	1529.53	83.01
Nov-14	10080.00	2446.26	3.52	2442.74	75.73%	1142.98	1260.00
Dec-14	10416.00	1829.31	6.16	1823.15	82.44%	1423.39	286.96
Jan-15	10416.00	1006.78	11.29	995.49	90.33%	806.24	0.00
Feb-15	9408.00	1373.45	11.61	1361.84	85.40%	979.13	309.59
Mar-15	10416.00	1191.36	14.06	1177.30	88.56%	1091.88	0.00
Apr-15	10080.00	1402.60	44.33	1358.27	86.09%	1279.72	0.00
May-15	10416.00	1739.79	13.31	1726.48	83.30%	1582.82	0.00
Jun-15	10080.00	1901.00	18.60	1882.40	81.14%	1782.93	0.00
Jul-15	10416.00	2417.74	5.20	2412.54	76.79%	2227.27	0.00
Total	122640.00	21013.55	173.74	20839.81	82.87%	16940.94	2373.94

*reason for unavailability

**main two crewing reasons broken down

Melton

Period				21P2			
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Below Minim Crewing	Crewing Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Retained	Action
Aug-14	744.00	271.62	12.02	259.60	63.49%	107.63	143.45
Sep-14	720.00	122.22	0.00	122.22	83.03%	122.22	0.00
Oct-14	744.00	145.35	0.00	145.35	80.46%	137.28	5.95
Nov-14	720.00	133.32	0.00	133.32	81.48%	43.27	90.00
Dec-14	744.00	93.31	2.08	91.23	87.46%	64.92	24.43
Jan-15	744.00	32.03	0.00	32.03	95.69%	32.03	0.00
Feb-15	672.00	70.71	0.23	70.48	89.48%	46.48	24.00
Mar-15	744.00	44.70	0.00	44.70	93.99%	44.15	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	79.85	0.97	78.88	88.91%	66.73	0.00
May-15	744.00	137.17	0.00	137.17	81.56%	132.68	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	135.92	0.00	135.92	81.12%	135.92	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	261.60	0.33	261.27	64.84%	258.85	0.00
Total	8760.00	1527.80	15.63	1512.17	82.56%	1192.16	287.83

Syston 22P2

Period				22P2			
	Hours Should be Available	Hours Not Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Below Minim Crewing Retained	Crewing Category Ind Action
Aug							
Sep							
Oct							
Nov							
Dec							
Jan							
Feb							
Mar							
Apr-15							
May-15							
Jun-15							
Jul-15							
Total							

Coalville

Period				25P2			
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Below Minim	Crewing
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Crewing Retained	Category Ind Action
Aug	744.00	96.10	1.63	94.47	87.08%	27.83	23.80
Sep	720.00	58.18	0.00	58.18	91.92%	14.87	0.00
Oct	744.00	44.82	0.00	44.82	93.98%	27.30	5.92
Nov	720.00	102.98	0.00	102.98	85.70%	6.10	90.00
Dec	744.00	61.73	0.00	61.73	91.70%	23.85	23.95
Jan	744.00	12.98	0.53	12.45	98.26%	8.97	0.00
Feb	672.00	31.67	0.00	31.67	95.29%	6.67	24.00
Mar	744.00	38.78	0.00	38.78	94.79%	12.65	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	63.98	38.40	25.58	91.11%	16.95	0.00
May-15	744.00	76.95	0.00	76.95	89.66%	53.90	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	134.16	0.03	134.13	81.37%	92.18	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	175.83	2.03	173.80	76.37%	144.78	0.00
Total	8760.00	898.16	42.62	855.54	89.75%	436.05	167.67

Ashby 26P1

Period				26P1			
						Below Minim	Crewing
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Crewing	Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Retained	Action
Aug	744.00	107.70	0.53	107.17	85.52%	52.52	30.97
Sep	720.00	69.12	0.00	69.12	90.40%	67.28	0.00
Oct	744.00	13.95	0.00	13.95	98.13%	5.98	5.92
Nov	720.00	118.08	0.00	118.08	83.60%	22.08	90.00
Dec	744.00	50.23	0.50	49.73	93.25%	13.45	31.75
Jan	744.00	17.15	1.83	15.32	97.69%	14.53	0.00
Feb	672.00	71.48	0.00	71.48	89.36%	44.37	24.00
Mar	744.00	38.13	0.00	38.13	94.88%	38.13	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	26.47	0.00	26.47	96.32%	20.53	0.00
May-15	744.00	14.48	2.45	12.03	98.05%	12.03	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	108.70	0.00	108.70	84.90%	106.68	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	45.57	0.00	45.57	93.88%	27.43	0.00
Total	8760.00	681.06	5.31	675.75	92.23%	425.01	182.64

Moira 27P2

Period				27P2			
	Hours Should be Available	Hours Not Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Below Minim Crewing Retained	Crewing Category Ind Action
Aug							
Sep							
Oct							
Nov							
Dec							
Jan							
Feb							
Mar							
Apr-15							
May-15							
Jun-15							
Jul-15							
Total	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	#DIV/0!	0.00	0.00

Shepshed

Period				28P1			
	Hours Should be Available	Hours Not Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Below Minim Crewing Retained	Crewing Category Ind Action
Aug							
Sep							
Oct							
Nov							
Dec							
Jan							
Feb							
Mar							
Apr-15							
May-15							
Jun-15							
Jul-15							
Total	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	#DIV/0!	0.00	0.00

Shepshed

Period				28P2			
						Below Minim	Crewing
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Crewing	Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Retained	Action
Aug	744.00	29.48	0.00	29.48	96.04%	6.10	21.87
Sep	720.00	6.37	6.37	0.00	99.12%	0.00	0.00
Oct	744.00	8.32	0.00	8.32	98.88%	2.40	5.92
Nov	720.00	90.00	0.00	90.00	87.50%	0.00	90.00
Dec	744.00	31.48	0.00	31.48	95.77%	0.00	24.53
Jan	744.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00%	0.00	0.00
Feb	672.00	24.75	0.75	24.00	96.32%	0.00	24.00
Mar	744.00	4.63	4.63	0.00	99.38%	0.00	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00%	0.00	0.00
May-15	744.00	19.18	6.95	12.23	97.42%	9.52	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	30.22	4.10	26.12	95.80%	12.08	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	24.10	0.00	24.10	96.76%	19.80	0.00
Total	8760.00	268.53	22.80	245.73	96.93%	49.90	166.32

Wigston

Period				31P2			
						Below Minim	Crewing
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Crewing	Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Retained	Action
Aug	744.00	140.20	1.28	138.92	81.16%	62.65	23.55
Sep	720.00	149.77	0.70	149.07	79.20%	65.00	0.00
Oct	744.00	101.12	0.00	101.12	86.41%	66.17	5.88
Nov	720.00	148.58	0.00	148.58	79.36%	52.00	90.00
Dec	744.00	152.07	0.52	151.55	79.56%	92.17	23.92
Jan	744.00	41.07	0.00	41.07	94.48%	13.92	0.00
Feb	672.00	88.43	3.98	84.45	86.84%	38.62	23.68
Mar	744.00	40.05	0.00	40.05	94.62%	12.63	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	47.11	2.93	44.18	93.46%	37.27	0.00
May-15	744.00	22.98	0.68	22.30	96.91%	16.62	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	12.75	0.00	12.75	98.23%	2.52	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	23.15	1.92	21.23	96.89%	16.35	0.00
Total	8760.00	967.28	12.01	955.27	88.96%	475.92	167.03

Billesdon

Period				32P2			
						Below Minim	Crewing
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Crewing	Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Retained	Action
Aug	744.00	360.60	0.00	360.60	51.53%	334.63	22.35
Sep	720.00	314.85	2.80	312.05	56.27%	293.28	0.00
Oct	744.00	237.30	0.00	237.30	68.10%	231.30	6.00
Nov	720.00	301.37	1.12	300.25	58.14%	210.25	90.00
Dec	744.00	238.60	0.00	238.60	67.93%	214.68	23.92
Jan	744.00	169.63	0.00	169.63	77.20%	169.63	0.00
Feb	672.00	217.22	0.00	217.22	67.68%	191.53	23.70
Mar	744.00	265.42	2.07	263.35	64.33%	263.35	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	225.78	0.00	225.78	68.64%	221.13	0.00
May-15	744.00	280.15	0.00	280.15	62.35%	251.37	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	246.88	0.00	246.88	65.71%	246.88	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	302.32	0.00	302.32	59.37%	287.15	0.00
Total	8760.00	3160.12	5.99	3154.13	63.93%	2915.18	165.97

Oakham

Period				33P2			
						Below Minim	Crewing
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Crewing	Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Retained	Action
Aug	744.00	278.35	0.00	278.35	62.59%	238.18	22.43
Sep	720.00	210.85	0.00	210.85	70.72%	162.32	0.00
Oct	744.00	359.55	0.00	359.55	51.67%	271.52	5.87
Nov	720.00	319.02	0.00	319.02	55.69%	228.33	90.00
Dec	744.00	252.88	0.00	252.88	66.01%	180.82	24.18
Jan	744.00	213.07	0.00	213.07	71.36%	116.38	0.00
Feb	672.00	232.65	0.00	232.65	65.38%	193.38	23.70
Mar	744.00	214.33	0.00	214.33	71.19%	188.13	
Apr-15	720.00	267.67	0.00	267.67	62.82%	253.68	0.00
May-15	744.00	291.13	0.00	291.13	60.87%	237.22	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	204.88	0.00	204.88	71.54%	194.50	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	316.42	0.00	316.42	57.47%	263.88	0.00
Total	8760.00	3160.80	0.00	3160.80	63.92%	2528.34	166.18

Uppingham 34P1

Period				34P1			
						Below Minim	Crewing
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Crewing	Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Retained	Action
Aug	744.00	252.41	0.78	251.63	66.07%	217.35	21.43
Sep	720.00	215.62	0.00	215.62	70.05%	208.08	0.00
Oct	744.00	227.15	3.80	223.35	69.47%	217.35	6.00
Nov	720.00	346.30	0.00	346.30	51.90%	240.67	90.00
Dec	744.00	348.95	0.00	348.95	53.10%	348.95	0.00
Jan	744.00	257.77	0.00	257.77	65.35%	202.45	0.00
Feb	672.00	192.80	0.00	192.80	71.31%	164.48	23.73
Mar	744.00	286.66	3.78	282.88	61.47%	282.88	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	263.06	2.03	261.03	63.46%	255.38	0.00
May-15	744.00	301.92	0.00	301.92	59.42%	300.93	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	358.32	0.00	358.32	50.23%	345.23	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	436.75	0.00	436.75	41.30%	397.43	0.00
Total	8760.00	3487.71	10.39	3477.32	60.19%	3181.18	141.16

Kibworth

Period				35P2			
						Below Minim	Crewing
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Crewing	Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Retained	Action
Aug	744.00	274.03	0.43	273.60	63.17%	257.20	13.67
Sep	720.00	182.18	0.33	181.85	74.70%	181.85	0.00
Oct	744.00	253.27	6.32	246.95	65.96%	240.95	6.00
Nov	720.00	269.10	0.00	269.10	62.63%	179.10	90.00
Dec	744.00	217.23	0.98	216.25	70.80%	216.25	0.00
Jan	744.00	120.19	0.67	119.52	83.85%	119.52	0.00
Feb	672.00	196.65	0.18	196.47	70.74%	172.73	23.73
Mar	744.00	149.60	3.20	146.40	79.89%	145.43	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	184.75	0.00	184.75	74.34%	168.35	0.00
May-15	744.00	197.87	0.00	197.87	73.40%	190.90	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	250.13	0.00	250.13	65.26%	246.90	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	256.42	0.00	256.42	65.53%	246.48	0.00
Total	8760.00	2551.42	12.11	2539.31	70.87%	2365.66	133.40

Market Harborough

Period				36P1			
						Below Minim	Crewing
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Crewing	Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Retained	Action
Aug	744.00	24.36	0.73	23.63	96.73%	0.00	23.63
Sep	720.00	3.08	1.75	1.33	99.57%	0.05	0.00
Oct	744.00	6.23	0.00	6.23	99.16%	0.38	5.85
Nov	720.00	90.00	0.00	90.00	87.50%	0.00	90.00
Dec	744.00	4.00	0.55	3.45	99.46%	0.00	3.45
Jan	744.00	1.07	1.07	0.00	99.86%	0.00	0.00
Feb	672.00	23.75	0.00	23.75	96.47%	0.00	23.75
Mar	744.00	0.23	0.00	0.23	99.97%	0.23	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00%	0.00	0.00
May-15	744.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00%	0.00	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	0.92	0.00	0.92	99.87%	0.92	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00%	0.00	0.00
Total	8760.00	153.64	4.10	149.54	98.25%	1.58	146.68

Market Harborough

Period	36P2						
						Below Minim	Crewing
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Crewing	Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Retained	Action
Aug	744.00	244.33	0.00	244.33	67.16%	229.83	14.50
Sep	720.00	273.29	0.57	272.72	62.04%	268.48	0.00
Oct	744.00	264.53	0.00	264.53	64.44%	258.53	6.00
Nov	720.00	176.93	0.00	176.93	75.43%	86.93	90.00
Dec	744.00	184.43	0.00	184.43	75.21%	160.58	23.85
Jan	744.00	98.72	0.00	98.72	86.73%	94.80	0.00
Feb	672.00	78.35	0.00	78.35	88.34%	54.60	23.75
Mar	744.00	80.28	0.00	80.28	89.21%	76.13	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	139.07	0.00	139.07	80.68%	139.07	0.00
May-15	744.00	294.88	0.00	294.88	60.37%	289.50	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	304.58	10.98	293.60	57.70%	293.60	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	413.57	0.00	413.57	44.41%	413.57	0.00
Total	8760.00	2552.96	11.55	2541.41	70.86%	2365.62	158.10

Lutterworth

Period	37P1						
						Below Minim	Crewing
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Crewing	Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Retained	Action
Aug	744.00	24.36	0.83	23.53	96.73%	0.00	23.53
Sep	720.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00%	0.00	0.00
Oct	744.00	5.87	0.00	5.87	99.21%	0.00	5.85
Nov	720.00	90.00	0.00	90.00	87.50%	0.00	90.00
Dec	744.00	23.85	0.00	23.85	96.79%	0.00	23.85
Jan	744.00	1.72	1.72	0.00	99.77%	0.00	0.00
Feb	672.00	23.77	0.00	23.77	96.46%	0.00	23.77
Mar	744.00	0.38	0.38	0.00	99.95%	0.00	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	1.73	0.00	1.73	99.76%	1.73	0.00
May-15	744.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00%	0.00	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	100.00%	0.00	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	2.05	0.00	2.05	99.72%	2.05	0.00
Total	8760.00	173.75	2.95	170.80	98.02%	3.78	167.00

Hinckley

Period	38P2						
	Hours Should be Available	Hours Not Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Below Minim Crewing Retained	Crewing Category Ind Action
Aug	744.00	35.98	0.55	35.43	95.16%	14.90	20.53
Sep	720.00	33.35	0.00	33.35	95.37%	30.37	0.00
Oct	744.00	16.00	0.00	16.00	97.85%	10.15	5.85
Nov	720.00	111.78	0.00	111.78	84.48%	17.85	90.00
Dec	744.00	53.15	1.53	51.62	92.86%	27.12	23.83
Jan	744.00	15.70	5.47	10.23	97.89%	8.33	0.00
Feb	672.00	44.62	0.00	44.62	93.36%	19.92	0.00
Mar	744.00	1.52	0.00	1.52	99.80%	1.52	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	7.50	0.00	7.50	98.96%	3.27	0.00
May-15	744.00	21.21	3.23	17.98	97.15%	7.27	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	8.27	2.72	5.55	98.85%	1.02	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	25.09	0.92	24.17	96.63%	14.63	0.00
Total	8760.00	374.17	14.42	359.75	95.73%	156.35	140.21

Market Bosworth

Period	39P2						
						Below Minim	Crewing
	Hours Should	Hours Not				Crewing	Category Ind
	be Available	Available	Mechanical	Crewing	% Available	Retained	Action
Aug	744.00	120.64	4.07	116.57	83.78%	87.90	28.67
Sep	720.00	53.39	0.17	53.22	92.58%	44.53	0.00
Oct	744.00	69.37	0.00	69.37	90.68%	60.22	6.00
Nov	720.00	148.80	2.40	146.40	79.33%	56.40	90.00
Dec	744.00	117.40	0.00	117.40	84.22%	80.60	35.30
Jan	744.00	25.68	0.00	25.68	96.55%	25.68	0.00
Feb	672.00	76.60	6.47	70.13	88.60%	46.35	23.78
Mar	744.00	26.65	0.00	26.65	96.42%	26.65	0.00
Apr-15	720.00	95.63	0.00	95.63	86.72%	95.63	0.00
May-15	744.00	81.87	0.00	81.87	89.00%	80.88	0.00
Jun-15	720.00	105.25	0.75	104.50	85.38%	104.50	0.00
Jul-15	744.00	134.87	0.00	134.87	81.87%	134.87	0.00
Total	8760.00	1056.15	13.86	1042.29	87.94%	844.21	183.75